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Ethnic unrest within China’s borders is commonly linked to problems of regional 
underdevelopment, yet ethnic minority issues have rarely been examined in the context of the PRC’s 
regional economic development plans. What is the political logic of China’s development in terms of 
minority policy? What resources are distributed, and where are they allocated? Here, I attempt to 
answer these questions in light of the Western Development Plan (WDP, xibudakaifa), China’s largest 
regional development plan to date. I argue the WDP functions as a control mechanism of ethnic unrest 
by distributing resources selectively to key minority areas.   
 





Problems in governance of ethnic minority populations have bedeviled democratic and 
authoritarian regimes alike. In the wake of increasing, and violent, ethnic conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sudan, democratic and non-democratic governments have 
puzzled over policies geared toward maintaining statehood in diverse societies. Emerging 
from this debate is a renewed interest in minority governance in authoritarian regimes. The 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), with its 55 official ethnic minorities comprising 
approximately 110 million people and populations larger than many of its neighboring 
nation-states, has sparked interest in recent years with ethnic unrest in its western territories 
of Xinjiang and Tibet.  
At the same time, China has launched a series of regional development plans
1
 aimed at 
ensuring balanced development across the nation. This article addresses the largest of these 
projects, the PRC’s Western Development Plan (WDP). Geared toward relatively 
underdeveloped inland areas, the WDP or Great Western Development (xibudakaifa) has 
been widely acknowledged as one of the PRC’s most prominent regional development 
strategies since the commencement of economic reform (gaigekaifang) in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. It has been particularly ambitious in terms of scope, both in investment amounts 
and geographic areas included in the plan. Although the impact of the WDP on western 
territories has been widely recognized, relatively few works have scrutinized the actual 
outcome of the WDP for minority regions. Here I assess the impact of the WDP on China’s 
minority areas. What is the political logic of the WDP’s minority policy? Who are the main 
actors, and how did the plan develop to include minority regions? What resources are 
distributed under this scheme, and where are they allocated?  
Given development of the WDP so far, commonly held theories of political and socio-
                                                          
* This work was supported by the Ewha Womans University Research Grant of 2013. 
1 The three major regional development plans are, in order of inception: Western Development Plan 
(WDP, xibudakaifa), Northeast Revitalization Plan (NRP, zhenxing dongbei laogongye jidi), and the 
Rise of the Central Regions (RCR, zhongbu jueqi jihua). 
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economic incentives driving the program appear in need of review. The main policy 
motivation and justification for the WDP was the problem of interregional inequality. Yet, 
after nearly 15 years of implementation, findings have emerged that suggest the WDP has 
neither been successful in nor particularly geared toward resolving this issue. Due to a 
variety of reasons, income inequality between regions and gaps in economic development 
has improved little since the inception of the plan. Instead, the WDP appears to have 
operated as a system of resource distribution and rent allocation (Shih, 2004). 
I argue the WDP fundamentally seeks to diminish ethnic security concerns by distributing 
resources to minority areas. Politicians in China’s authoritarian regime have strong 
incentives to seek out career security by pursuing policies favorable to career advancement. 
Among these policies, control of ethnic minorities in border areas and in restive regions has 
become a prerequisite to maintaining a career. As the WDP has expanded over time, 
politicians have increased its scope in order to redistribute to ethnic minority regions across 
the nation. The concept of the “West” in the WDP has broken geographic boundaries to 
stand for the “periphery” as opposed to the “center,” rather than simply the landmass to the 
inland of China.  
In the following pages, I advance my argument. The next section covers the inception of 
the WDP, noting the rationale for the plan and its shifting goals. “Minority Policy in the 
WDP” details the political development of the WDP’s minority policy and its geographic 
scope, especially its inclusion of minority areas outside the traditional scope of the 
geographic west. In “Resource Allocation and Development in Minority Areas,” I provide an 
overview of resource allocation, showing that the start of the WDP correlates with increased 
transfers and investment to minority-heavy areas, and discussing the implications of such 
findings. Afterwards I conclude with discussion and suggestions for research in the future. 
 
 
2. THE RATIONALE FOR THE WDP 
 
The WDP was essentially a large-scale stimulus and investment package geared toward 
the “West,” or inland area of mainland China, announced by the central leadership of the 
PRC in 1999 and put in motion formally and in reality by 2000. The dominant view – 
political and academic – during the period leading up to the WDP pointed to regional 
economic inequality as the main rationale for the plan. Most argued that under Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reform campaign, eastern coastal provinces received the greater share 
of benefits from the “get rich first” strategy of export-led economic development,
2
 which led 
to marked and growing economic disparities between coastal areas and inland provinces, and 
rural and urban areas (Wang and Hu, 1999; Golley, 2007; Naughton and Yang, 2004). 
According to some accounts, living standards between the coast and interior regions varied 
to the point where by 1992 over 80% of the country’s national poverty counties
3
 were 
                                                          
2 As most of the literature notes, the strategy called for unbalanced development, intentionally favoring 
the coastal provinces in order to pursue export-led development. Deng Xiaoping’s two-stage plan 
called for balanced development, or re-balancing, after the coastal province strategy had succeeded; 
WDP was seen by many as the fulfillment of this overall strategy (Lai, 2002).  
3 National poverty counties were designated in the 1980s by the central government in response to 
external pressure from the World Bank to reduce the country’s poverty level. Counties were selected 
by the central government (presumably on basis of income alone, although experience indicates both 




located in non-coastal regions. Even among urban areas, coastal per capita income levels 
were at least 40% higher than the interior (Lai, 2002). In mainland China, a rare consensus 
emerged, spearheaded in academia by scholars such as Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, 
among others, who published and publicly argued that the central government had a 
responsibility to restore the balance between regions. Such arguments were supported by 
subnational governments in the interior and became a lobbying point for representatives in 
the National People’s Congress and Communist Party Congress
4
 (Lai, 2002; Holbig, 2004) .  
Thus, a substantial body of work has grown out of this literature on regional development 
and inequality over the last decade with specific focus on regional inequality in China’s 
WDP.
5
 Some hailed the WDP as a success (Liu, Wang, and Hu 2009). On the other hand, an 
emerging academic literature has argued that the WDP allocated resources in a manner that 
contributed little to resolving problems of regional inequality (Li and Gibson, 2012; Grewal 
and Ahmed, 2011; Shih, 2004; Gong, 2005; Choi, 2010; Kim, 2012). 
These findings throw a questioning light on regional inequality as the main impetus for 
the WDP. Even in the early stages of the WDP, scholars noted the differences in stated 
policy goals of the plan by a variety of actors involved in decision-making (Goodman, 2004; 
Shih, 2004; Naughton, 2004; Holbig, 2004; Lai, 2002). These at times conflicting goals were 
primarily 1) the alleviation of regional inequality proclaimed by Jiang Zemin, with the State 
Council on Development and Reform adding the goal of 2) increasing social and national 
stability in western areas, a blanket statement generally seen as referring to minority-
populated areas (Goodman, 2004a), and 3) the goal of environmental protection. As the plan 
expanded scholars went on to point to a variety of different political and economic rationales 
for the WDP. Shih argues for a leadership-based analysis, stating that “top State Council 
officials structured [Western Development Plan] policies to bolster the jurisdictions of the 
central bureaucracy, to increase central power over rent distribution, and to complement a 
host of other policy objectives to help their own individual or factional interests.”(Shih, 
2004: 435) Naughton more broadly points to economic equality concerns by the center along 
with trends in fiscal policy after 1994, arguing fiscal reform in 1994 strengthened central 
government power over redistribution, doing away with the traditional aversion to fiscal 
deficits by the late 1990s and creating an expansionist fiscal environment that supported 
government-led spending projects such as the WDP (Naughton, 2004). In addition, China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001 was argued to have added to central government motives to 
balance regional development (Holbig, 2004). Others fleshed out the narrative with accounts 
focusing on relationships between center, province-level and local governments, and 
intergovernmental bargaining and lobbying as key to the resource allocation and 
implementation of the WDP (Hong, 2004; Goodman, 2004b; Oakes, 2004; Litzinger, 2004).  
The literature alluded generally to minority support as a component of the WDP (Wang 
and Hu, 1999), but so far few have directly scrutinized the impact of the WDP on minority 
                                                          
income and other factors such as geographic location, minority status, etc. apparently influenced 
selection). 
4 Holbig (2004) sees such a regional coalition emerging not only during the period leading up to the 
WDP but during economic reform, particularly leading up to Deng Xiaoping’s two-stage strategy of 
development.  
5 For the former, see Yang (1990; 2012), Golley (2007), Naughton and Yang (2004), Sheng (2010), 
Wang and Hu (1999). 
 JIHYEON JEONG  4 
 
populations, either at the early or later stages of the plan.
6
 In spite of the early debate on 
regional inequality, the WDP has emerged as a plan that appears geared toward rent 
allocation and state-led distribution of benefits (Shih, 2004). The question that emerges out 
of this is: where does the government distribute, and for what purpose? The next section 
details how distribution to minorities emerged out of the development of the WDP. 
 
 
3. MINORITY POLICY IN THE WDP 
 
3.1 The Development of the WDP 
 
In 1999, Jiang Zemin publicly proclaimed the plan in a speech referring to “Western 
Great Development” (xibudakaifa) to address regional economic inequality within China. By 
2000, major party central decision-making organizations and the state ministry formally 
accepted the project, with Premier Zhu Rongji proclaiming it China’s greatest project of the 
21
st




 Party Plenum in 2000 (Gong, 2005). Following the leadership’s 
public announcement of the WDP, economic and planning work conferences endorsed the 
WDP in late 1999 and in 2000 the Western Development Leadership Small Group, headed 
by Zhu Rongji, established the Western Development Office under the State Council. 
The minority component of this plan was apparent from the beginning to many observers. 
According to Goodman (2004a), Zhu Rongji openly pointed to this advantage by saying 
““common prosperity” would result in the “strengthening of national unity, safeguarding of 
social stability, and consolidation of border defense,” all of which were barely coded phrases 
for being concerned about issues surrounding the non-Han Chinese.” (Goodman, 2004a: 326) 
Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang noted the ethnic minority component in developing 
western China, and Naughton (2004) likewise pointed to minorities in emphasizing the goal 
of national unity underlying the WDP.  
Under the Western Development Leadership Small Group the timeline for the WDP 
roughly followed three stages: the first period during the tenth five-year plan from 2001 to 
2005, in which the early background of the program was established; the second period 
beginning with the eleventh five-year plan from 2006 to 2015, when most projects were 
pushed forward; and a third period in which as a result of projects regional imbalances would 
be corrected. Overall, the plan encompassed up to 50 years (Chung, Lai, and Joo, 2009). 
Each stage incorporated a loose group of projects broadly situated in the areas of 
infrastructure development, energy resources, and environmental protection. These were 
meant to dovetail with the five policy goals announced at the beginning of the plan by Zhu 
Rongji in 2000: 1) rapid development of infrastructure,
7
 2) environmental preservation, 3) 
restructuring of industry, 4) developing science and technology skills, and 5) attracting 
investment.  
Projects were often large in scale, such as the Qinghai-Tibet railway line. A massive 
infrastructure project, the railway development scheme was one of the most prominent of the 
WDP, purporting to cover nearly 2,000 km. Similar construction was undertaken to connect 
                                                          
6 Exceptions include Barabantseva (2009) and Potter (2011). 
7 Note the slight differences in the literature regarding the main policies or strategies of the WDP 
announced in 2000; Choi (2010) argues that in the place of infrastructure development, one of the five 
policies was “strengthening the macreconomic environment.” (Choi, 2010) 




the country’s highway systems over 17,000 km of land (Choi, 2010). Energy-related schemes 
such as the Xinjiang pipeline, stretching over 4,200 km (Naughton, 2004) which aims to 
transfer natural gas from the Tarim Basin to the east coast, were initiated, and the country’s 
electricity grid was unified with energy transfers from the west to east through three major 
channels. These projects mixed a majority of government funding with domestic and 
international investment, with natural resource investment spearheaded by state-owned 
enterprises and a combination of domestic and foreign firms investing in exploration and 
early stages of excavation 
But even more striking were the political incentives underlying the WDP which 
ultimately led to the plan shifting – and losing – focus from the original goal of ameliorating 
regional inequality to incorporate myriad overlapping goals and purposes. As the literature 
on Chinese politics has amply acknowledged, politicians in an authoritarian political system 
such as China face greater losses in the event of losing power and therefore have stronger 
incentives to hold onto political control. Shih (2004) and other scholars point out the 
importance of politicians’ consolidating and increasing control over a variety of policy-
making processes in order to increase their career standing, and ultimately their hold on 
political power. The WDP greatly enhanced the power of the State Development and 
Planning Commission (SDPC, currently part of the National Development and Reform 
Commission
8
 (NDRC)), under the State Council (SC) over economic policy-making (Shih, 
2004). SDPC officials served concurrently in the Western Development Office. As the SDPC 
grew in power, officially serving as an approval chamber for large-scale construction and 
infrastructure projects, individual interests and career incentives affected policy goals so that 
the WDP broadened to include multiple policy objectives as time passed. 
Tellingly, several have noted the decentralized, incremental nature of the plan, as the 
stated policy goals of the plan shifted and broadened (Naughton, 2004; Shih, 2004; Holbig, 
2004). The stated goal of regional re-balancing gave way to five main policy goals 
announced in the first few years, which included issues such as environmental degradation 
and minority nationalities. Ten major projects were announced, to be taken over by new 
projects and or merged with previous ongoing projects as new white papers and documents 
came to light. The timetable for the plan shifted occasionally, with second and third stages 
being shifted backwards and then forward. The confusion bled into the early literature on the 
WDP, forcing shifts in focal points as authors followed the most recent developments. Much 
of this contributed to the perception of the WDP as a fungible, sprawling strategy: Holbig 
(2004) characterizes the program as “soft policy” and Naughton (2004) uses the term 
“omnibus strategy” to describe the plethora of policy goals taken on. 
This process exemplifies the career incentives faced by politicians in these decision-
making organizations. In each area, the need to hold onto political power creates changes and 
shifts in the WDP, so that the plan shifts to incorporate multiple policy goals of multiple 
political actors in the central and local governments. Among these, the goal of maintaining 
stability in minority and border areas serves as a strong career incentive for central 
politicians in light of the government’s emphasis on controlling unrest in ethnic minority 
areas and pursuing “national unity.” By the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2003, the 
government had officially phrased the minority issue as one of national unity and border 
security: 
 
                                                          
8 See Martin (2014) on the development of the NDRC and its role under the Hu-Wen administration.  
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“Implementing the Western Development Program is an important program for promoting 
the unity and enrichment of various nationalities; and a necessary measure for ensuring 




3.2 Geographic Boundaries of the “West” and Minority Populations 
 
The geographical scope of the WDP is perhaps its most striking character, and most 
illustrative of the fungible nature of the WDP itself. Traditionally, China’s coastal region as 
demarcated in government documents and analyses consists of nine provinces: Liaoning, 
Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan, and three 
province-level municipalities: Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. In contrast the Western Region 
is made up of nine provinces and one municipality: Shaanxi, Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu, 
Sichuan, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Guizhou and Tibet; and the Chongqing province-level 
municipality. The remaining provinces constitute the Central Region (Keng, 2006).  
Within these traditional boundaries WDP started out by incorporating first the ten 
western areas (nine provinces and one municipality), then suddenly shifting to twelve in 
2000 by incorporating two more: ethnic minority-dominated Guangxi and Inner Mongolia. In 
2001 three minority regions, Yanbian Minority Autonomous Area in northeast Jilin, the 
Xiangxi Tujia-Miao Autonomous Prefecture of Hunan, and the Enshi Tujia-Miao 
Autonomous Prefecture of Hubei were added to receive “preferential treatments” (Holbig, 
2004; Goodman, 2004) .  
A puzzle emerges here: many of the central and coastal provinces excluded from WDP 
suffer from the same problems of poverty, low income, and underdevelopment. Why include 
specifically minority dominated areas in the central and coastal regions and exclude others? 
By the standards of regional inequality laid out by Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang (Wang 
and Hu, 1999), and by most accounts supporting the notion of regional imbalances, the 
central provinces in the interior were no different from areas in the plan, and certainly did not 
differ from the areas added in 2000 and 2001.  
The Inner Mongolia Minority Autonomous Region was included as part of the northwest 
ecological area, citing the problem of ecological degradation in the grasslands and 
desertification issues that warranted inclusion into environmental projects funded by the 
WDP (Holbig, 2004). Guangxi, a Zhuang minority autonomous province and a coastal area, 
was puzzling because it had previously received benefits as a coastal province during 
development. While Xiangxi and Enshi at least bordered Chongqing geographically, 
Yanbian also startled foreign watchers because it was neither western (rather, despite Jilin’s 
inclusion into the central provinces, its actual location is on the opposite end of the mainland 
to the northeast), nor, in comparison to regions in the western and central areas, particularly 
noted as a region marked by inequality. These areas were included on minority development 
grounds, but the question of selection criteria remained. Goodman (2004a) argues that 
variation in terms of poverty and inequality, level of development, even minority population 
makeup does not really explain this regional selection. Even if regional inequality between 
coast and west exists, the “West” includes areas that have high GDP, and significant 




                                                          
9 Translation taken from Pittman (2011), original source “Guowuyuan Xibu Kaifa Ban 2003.”  
10 He also points out that minority areas, as we know, are not majority minority for the most part; 




Documentary resources from minority regions indicate the central government 
deliberately included these areas in the WDP for political purposes. In 2001, in a document 
sent to the Yanbian local government the Western Development Office of the State Council 
referred to Yanbian as “geographically in the Central Region zone, but a less developed area 
inhabited by ethnic minorities” (Western Development Office of the State Council, 2001). 
The document states the intent of inclusion in the WDP is to speed up development and 
narrow the development gap, along with Enshi and Xiangxi. It also points to the importance 
of Yanbian’s location as a “foreign economic post in the China, Russia and North Korea tri-
border area and east of the Sea of Japan” (Western Development Office of the State Council, 
2001). Altogether, the document shows a distinct goal of including minority regions in the 
WDP, despite geographic location outside the traditional West, in order to distribute 
resources to specific minorities that are in strategic locations whose restiveness might prove 
problematic to the central government.  
The traditional conception of the “periphery,” or “border area,” versus the “center” in 
China has played a major role in this process of gradual inclusion of minority areas in the 
WDP. That is, WDP as a regional development plan for the “West” in reality encompasses 
every inland border province in China, whose long periphery borders 14 land neighbors. Not 
only do provinces generally considered “western” fall under this plan, the central 
government has also included under either the WDP or a very similar set of plans minority 
areas to the Northeast, including the Yanbian Korean minority area in Jilin Province, and 
Inner Mongolia. The WDP is in geographic reality a plan for non-coastal China, 
encompassing most of the nation, a conceptual “West” that exists as an entity outside the 
eastern corridor of the traditional Zhongyuan and prosperous southeast and Beijing. While 
the center-periphery characterization of the WDP is not new, as others (Becquelin, 2004; 
Potter, 2011) have previously emphasized this component at the inception of the plan, what 
is surprising is that this dynamic has only become more apparent over time, as not only 
minority border regions become part of the WDP but the WDP takes on strategies and 
projects that increasingly point to strengthening certain borders through redistribution of 
resources rather than simply correcting regional imbalances 
We find control mechanisms by the center employed in order to rein in periphery areas or 
strengthen porous borders, in the form of resource allocation, welfare distribution, and the 
use of tactics such as crackdowns on religious activities or education or even relocation. In 
WDP this viewpoint leads to an economic plan that appears to increase benefits to these 
areas, but the trickle-down effect to minorities is not always a given conclusion so long as 
control over a geographical landmass is the primary concern. Even allowing for variation in 
implementation caused by subnational and local-level government, this overall framework 
remains valid. The next section takes on the question of the outcome of the WDP in minority 
areas and focuses on illustrating this dynamic further.  
  
                                                          
population makeup of minorities has long since ceased to match administrative designations and 
indeed never really matched it in the first place. 
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4. RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN MINORITY AREAS 
 
4.1 Fiscal Transfers 
 
The fiscal background of the WDP lies in the 1994 tax system reforms, in which the 
center restructured center-local relations in fiscal policies to increase central revenue and the 
tax base, primarily relying on consumer-based taxation such as the VAT (value-added tax). 
The 1994 reforms are generally argued to have decreased provincial bargaining power with 
the center in return for increased autonomy in local taxation and fiscal management. 
Provinces therefore lost the ability to leverage the center, and the center increased its ability 
to leverage provinces because provincial budgets relied on returned shares of revenue and 
handouts from the government. This dependence was particularly marked in the western and 
central regions, which came to increasingly rely on fiscal transfers from the central 
government to make up for their comparatively lacking sources of revenue.  
Thus at the time of the WDP’s inception, around 2000, the western and central regions 
lacked the bargaining power necessary to leverage the central government to receive pork 
and handouts. Instead, the WDP is mostly seen, fiscally, as a distributive initiative of the 
central government for the center’s interests (Shih, 2004).
11
 The renewed control of the 
center over fiscal policy since 1994 was matched by the expansionist environment of the 
period, allowing the center to spend relatively freely (Naughton, 2004). 
The process of political re-centralization and concentration of power in the center thus 
explains the major role played by center-to-local fiscal handouts in the WDP. Funding for the 
WDP involved a mix of domestic and foreign direct investment for major projects. But it 
primarily involved government-backed investment and earmarked transfers, from central to 
local governments. Part of the rent allocation of the WDP (Shih, 2004), these transfers serve 
as a useful measure of government support in the WDP. Because earmarked transfers are not 
contingent on provincial GDP or the amount of revenue brought in during the past year, we 
can use this measure as a separate indicator of central government intent.  
Between 2000 and 2004, the share of the western region in total fiscal transfers across the 
nation rose from 28.0% to 34.4% (Grewal and Ahmed, 2011). An overview of the 
distribution of per capita fiscal transfers at the time of the inception of the WDP shows an 
increase in earmarked funds distributed to minority-heavy border areas. Figure 1 shows 
lagged per capita transfers trends in all 31 provinces and province-level administrative units 
from 1995 to 2003. Among the areas included in the WDP with the exception of Shaanxi, all 
other areas experience an increase in funding around 2000. But the trend is particularly 
marked in Tibet and Qinghai, provinces populated by the restive Tibetan population, and 
Ningxia, where the minority Hui population is concentrated. Overall, the data corroborates 
government documentary evidence from this period that indicate special transfers were made 
available to minority-heavy areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang (State Development and 
Reform Commission and Western Development Office, 2002). Fiscal transfers are further 
distributed to other minority areas. Hainan, with its large Muslim Hui population, sees an 
increase in fiscal transfers around 2000. In contrast, Shaanxi, which has fewer minorities,  
                                                          
11 More in line, perhaps, with the dominant argument of regional inequality is the allegation that the 
1994 fiscal reforms further disadvantaged the interior provinces by decreasing the proportion of 
central transfers and increasing provincial government deficit in non-coastal areas (Lai, 2002). 




Figure 1. Estimated Per Capita Fiscal Transfers to Province-Level Units, 1995-2003 
Source: PRC Ministry of Finance and Finance Yearbook of China (Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian, 
1996-2004). Data provided by Victor Shih and Mingxing Liu. 
 
 
experiences a dip in transfers in spite of its inclusion in the WDP.  
Also of interest is the increase in transfers evident in the Northeast provinces around this 
time. Known as the “Rust Belt” of China, the Northeast experienced a significant economic 
downturn after economic reform in the 1980s and 1990s brought about the dismantling of 
large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and a shift from heavy industries to consumer goods. 
By the 1990s and 2000s, labor unrest in the region’s factories and mines grew at a rapid pace, 
and the Northeast became the subject of increased attention by the central government as a 
region prone to unrest. In 2003 the central government announced the Northeast 
Revitalization Plan(NRP, zhenxing dongbei laogongye jidi) or Revitalize the Northeast Old 
Industrial Bases, another regional development plan aimed at increasing economic disparity 
between the Northeast and the Southern coastal regions (Zhang 2008; Chung et al., 2009). 
The plan was announced in 2003 and formally put into motion only in 2009 to 2010. 
However, the data shows a marked increase in transfers to the Northeast region around 2000, 
at the inception of the WDP. The Northeast region is home to a heavy concentration of 
border minorities, including the aforementioned Yanbian Korean Autonomous Area. The 
uptick in transfers at the inception of the WDP suggests border minority concerns motivated 
fiscal transfers, or grants, regardless of actual “western” geographic location.  
 
4.2 Investment Projects  
 
Another channel of resource allocation Beijing has utilized is the economic funding, 
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employment and development opportunities offered by large-scale state-sponsored 
investment projects in the WDP. As noted previously, some of the largest infrastructure and 
natural resource extraction projects are geared toward minority areas such as Xinjiang and 
Tibet. For example, the Qinghai-Tibet railway line and the Xinjiang gas pipeline are located 
over Tibet and Xinjiang, and involve massive amounts of funding from the center. The 
Qinghai-Tibet railway alone attracted state investment approved at the amount of 33.09 
billion yuan, and government audits estimate 21.42 billion yuan of actual investment 
occurred up to 2005.
12
 Minority regions later included in the WDP were likewise recipients 
of project investment. In rural Enshi in 2003, the prefecture head Zhou Xianwang reportedly 
quoted the NDRC saying an investment of approximately 700 million RMB would be made 
in the next five years to promote biogas technology in the region (Xinhua, 2003). The area 
also received funding for road and infrastructure projects linking rural areas to larger urban 
hubs. In 2002, Yanbian announced the area had received a record 550 million RMB in State 
treasury-bond investment from the central government, mostly for infrastructure and 
industrial projects, and had 48 projects planned for regional development (People’s Daily, 
2002). Preferential tax benefits and exemptions were reported as part of the WDP’s plan for 
improving the region’s economy.  
Foreign investment in general was encouraged, and according to Goodman (2004a), 
during 2001 to 2002 almost every province in the West arranged trade fairs and visits from 
potential investors. Grewal and Ahmed (2011) report the number of foreign investment 
projects in the West with labor cooperation from the west increased by 5.6% between 2001 
and 2003. Foreign aid projects were also seen as viable sources of economic development, 
with Yunnan, a traditionally underdeveloped area, making aid and NGO projects a central 
part of their development strategy (Goodman, 2004a). 
Domestic investment was another, highly important aspect of the central government’s 
plan. While Chung, Lai, and Joo (2009) find foreign direct investment in the WDP less 
important, they emphasize the domestic component in which firms in the eastern part of 
China were expected to act as a source of investment.
13
 Province-level units in China were 
encouraged to cooperate and “help out” sister provinces in the inland (Potter, 2011); for 
instance, the province of Jilin in the Northeast announced 23 million RMB would be used for 
a construction resource-producing facility in Tibet in 2001. In 2003, Jilin was expected to 
participate in 10 projects in Tibet in the industries of tourism development, social services, 
human resource training, and infrastructure development. Overall, 3.2 million RMB was 
planned in investment in Tibet from Jilin. 
For minority areas, the border component in some of these projects was apparent. 
Yanbian, for instance, was encouraged to propose projects geared toward attracting foreign 
investment from, and eventually trade with, nearby Russia and South Korea.
14
 Yunnan’s 
large hydropower plants, drawing electricity from the Lancang and Nu River areas, were 
built with the prospect of a nearby Southeast Asian electricity market (Magee, 2004). Even 
                                                          
12 Investment amounts were first drawn up by the SPC at 26.21 billion RMB in June, 2001. In June 
2005, the NDRC raised this amount to 33.09 billion yuan, a plan approved by the State Council 
(National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China 2006).  
13 The process of constructing “[east-west] domestic linkages” (dongxi lianxi) was emphasized (Chung 
et al., 2009).  
14 While stymied for decades, the Tumen River Development Project, an initiative of the UNDP, 
remains a symbolic project. 




Xinjiang saw the birth of special economic zones (SEZs) promoting trade with Central Asia, 
complete with incentives such as lower taxes and tax reforms. The SEZ area located in 
Khorgos of Xinjiang is also the site of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan (Shi, 2011).  
However, the issue of investment projects is complicated by the apparent lack of results 
in attracting private investment versus state loans. While the center announced large-scale 
investment projects would be funded by domestic and international sources, increasing 
overall investment in the West, the Western Region’s share of national investment remained 
unchanged from 2000 to 2004 (Grewal and Ahmed, 2011). Shih (2004) and Chung, Lai, and 
Joo (2009) all point to the failure of the WDP to attract foreign investment. Not only that, 
Goodman (2004) points to the fact that most of these investment projects were already in 
motion before the WDP was implemented, rendering the WDP’s project investment 
considerably smaller than publicity would suggest. In addition, while the WDP appears to 
have allocated substantial resources to minority areas, the question of “who benefits?” 
remains. Do these investment projects have a trickle-down effect on actual minority 
populations in the area? The next section details some of the changes, and problems, 
associated with WDP in minority regions. 
 
4.3 Migration, Population Change and Problems 
 
Concurrent with the resource allocation in terms of fiscal transfers and investment in the 
WDP is the issue of migration in minority regions. On the one hand, human resource 
allocation to Western areas, where skilled personnel are scarce and education level low 
relative to the developed East, is a major component of the WDP’s resource allocation 
scheme. From the beginning of the plan, officials signaled their awareness of the relative 
scarcity of high-skilled labor in regions included. As part of Zhu Rongji’s fourth policy goal, 
“developing science and technology skills,” investments included government support for 
education and high-skill training, and most importantly support for skilled and unskilled 
migration to relatively underdeveloped areas. While acknowledging the gaps in technical 
knowledge and skill in minority-heavy regions, the center sought to address the problem in 
the short term by offering incentives for migration. Documents from this period show central 
government promoted migration to western areas through the establishment of hardship 
allowances for employment in WDP areas, and relaxed the household registration system 
(hukou), encouraging skilled operators in investment projects in the West to retain their 
original hukou and thereby benefits they enjoyed in the non-western areas (Xinhua, 2001). 
Skilled college students in particular were given incentives to become “volunteers” in the 
region. They were offered stipends, including medical care, preferential treatment in 
government civil service exams, training courses and priority admission to graduate-level 
programs (Chinese Communist Youth League, 2009). 
In addition, reverse migration from central and eastern areas to inland China reflected 
state goals of changing the flow of internal migration and diverting workers from areas that 
had seen massive flows of migrant labor in the 1980s and 1990s. “According to a member of 
the State Council, “the phenomenon of ‘the peacock flying to the south-east’” ― as this 
migration was characterized ― will be replaced by the “phenomenon of the ‘peacock flying 
west’.”” (Goodman, 2004a: 327). Low-skilled labor also poured into the region, locating 
primarily around construction sites and urban areas.  
Accordingly both low and high-skilled migration, under the WDP, took off in particular 
in the west in Xinjiang. Over the past decade since the inception of the WDP a continued 
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stream of Han migrants poured into Xinjiang, seeking work in government-funded 
investment projects and construction (Martina, 2014; Demick and Pierson, 2009). While the 
census data from the period of the WDP does not show a radical change in the share of Han 
versus Uyghur and other minority populations in the total population of Xinjiang from 2000 
to 2010, the census data does not take into account the population of unregistered migrants 
and the heavily Han-dominated Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) (Côté, 
2015).  
In-migration to minority areas has given rise to allegations that incentives for migration 
disrupt the population balance between Han and minorities in the region, intentionally 
reducing the minority presence and creating ethnic tensions, furthering repression of 
minorities in general. Since the 1950s, a continued stream of Han migration into Xinjiang 
has reduced the dominance of the Uyghur ethnic group and other ethnicities vis-à-vis the 
Han (Côté, 2015). The current incentives and jobs offered to Han migrants have been 
controversial in this regard (see next section “Discussion”). 
In addition, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC or bingtuan) has 
been the main organization driving economic development and political control in Xinjiang 
since the 1950s. Maintained as a quasi-military organization directly controlled by the central 
government, outside the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the XPCC was set up with the 
purpose of political control of a porous border and economic development in a western area 
(Kim et al., 2008), and still exists today as a political and economic organization responsible 
for at least one-seventh of Xinjiang’s economic output. The bingtuan essentially acted as a 
group of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the process of economic development. Xinjiang 
has been, and continues to be, an economy disproportionately dominated by SOEs (Yu, 
2013). This situation is compounded by the fact that many of the bingtuan residents are PLA 
retirees, and overwhelmingly Han. The bingtuan has been viewed as an organization 
perpetuating Han-Uyghur disparities by placing most Han in management position versus the 
Uyghur, and employing mostly Han employees, thereby ensuring that the trickle-down effect 





An assessment of minority policies in and coinciding with the WDP brings to the surface 
the question of “who benefits?”: minorities or non-minorities, or the societal groups and 
cleavages crisscrossing the divide. On the one hand, we have evidence of fiscal and other 
resources allocated primarily to minority areas. On the other, we are faced with a question: 
do the resources allocated to minority areas actually trickle down to minority residents? 
Although lacking comprehensive national-level statistical data on minority incomes, media, 
lay and scholarly accounts bring evidence counter to state claims of WDP improving 
minority economies. In Tibet and Xinjiang, minorities report racial discrimination in 
employment opportunities, with new jobs created by construction and infrastructure projects 
mostly allocated to Han migrants newly settled in the area (Demick and Pierson, 2009; 
Gilley, 2001; Green, 2006). Xinjiang farmers report losing land and opportunities to Han 
farmers who are subsidized (Lipes, 2013). In terms of income, the Tibetan population is 
generally estimated to have considerably lower incomes than the Han (Lhundup and Ma, 
2013), and Han residents are supposed to enjoy greater returns to education and employment 
in both areas (Hannum and Xie, 1998). Investment projects are often managed and owned by 




Han (Wong, 2010).  
These disparities have been linked to ethnic unrest and inter-ethnic hostilities in both 
Tibet and Xinjiang. The most recent instances of large-scale ethnic conflict in 2008 and 2009 
have attracted strong responses from the central government, and ethnic hostilities continue 
to drive violence in the region (Lipes, 2010; 2012).   
The extent of local and central actions against minorities that occurs in conjunction with 
the WDP also points to evidence against state claims. Minorities in western regions have 
increasingly fought against and expressed frustration with policies repressing expression of 
religion and linguistic and educational dominance of center-driven Chinese-language 
education in schools (Wong, 2010; Demick and Pierson, 2009). Political repression of 
prominent minority intellectuals, such as the Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti, has drawn 
international attention (Grace, 2014). Media and scholarly evidence suggest agency issues 
plague the WDP, allowing local governments leeway to use the WDP to pocket 
administrative funding
15
 and appropriate minority land for local government usage (Lipes, 
2013). These reports suggest the WDP’s minority policy is not aimed at increasing minority 
economic welfare per se, but rather increasing state control in minority regions by increasing 
Han presence and organizations of control in these areas, thereby directly benefiting 
politicians whose career incentives remain contingent on maintaining stability in otherwise 
restive regions.  
The WDP may be characterized as a “civilizing project,” similar to the earlier attempts at 
“civilizing” minority regions carried out by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
previous political leadership.
16
 Yet the current contours of the plan, and its impact on 
minority regions, suggests career incentives and politicians’ need to retain power – and in the 
process, power over economic policy-making processes in local regions (Shih, 2004) – play 
an important part in the shifting and fungible nature of the WDP and its minority policy. 
Certainly the center-periphery dynamic shown in the geographic scope of the WDP gives 
some credence to the notion of the center trying to civilize minority border regions. But even 
more, we see a focus on political control and increasing Han presence in these regions rather 
than increasing minority benefits. This supports the idea that political career incentives, 





Although many studies have attempted to analyze the impact of the WDP on the Chinese 
economy, few have been able to present an adequate overview of minority policy in the 
WDP. An expanding plan, the WDP has shifted from its focus on regional inequality to 
incorporate many additional goals: sustainable development and environmental protection, 
maintaining stability in minority regions, etc. Yet the core of its minority policy points to the 
same theme as previous actions by the CCP: expanding and strengthening central control 
over minority areas. The possibility of ethnic unrest in these regions, be it external or internal 
in origin, serves to create central incentives to expand control in order for central politicians 
to serve their career goals.  
Because the WDP was followed in three to four years by the Northeast Revitalization 
                                                          
15 For the use of earmarked fiscal transfers as discretionary funding, see Shih (2004).  
16 See Harrell (1995) for discussion on civilizing projects in China. 
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Plan and afterwards, Rise of the Central Regions, the data for this period possibly conflates 
these distinct yet overlapping regional development schemes. But the main thrust of the 
WDP remains the same, in its geographical scope, clearly delineated in government 
documents and reports. The fact that the WDP included minority areas unrelated to the 
traditional geographical area of the “West,” and proceeded to follow up with fiscal transfers 
and primarily state-led investment, proves the importance placed upon minority regions in 
the WDP. Instead of regional inequality serving as the main impetus for the plan, we find a 
plethora of goals conflicting and overlapping in the WDP, with minority control as one of the 
main objectives. 
Additionally, I find ample room for discussion in regards to the effectiveness of the WDP 
in terms of minority welfare. While the WDP provides central politicians with a control 
mechanism for minority areas, it functions less as a mechanism for providing actual benefits 
to citizens. The accounts of malfeasance and preferential policies toward Han, encouraging 
migration, are not limited to Xinjiang and Tibet, although these are the two major areas of 
interest in the Chinese inland under the WDP. Minority grievances are voiced in areas far 
apart geographically from the West, and remain relevant for all minority areas included in 
the WDP. 
Finally, research in the future will able to properly assess the role of the WDP in China’s 
regional economic development as it progresses. In the meantime, the role of minority policy 
in the WDP is crucial to understanding the layout of the plan itself, and the role of political 
incentives in shaping economic policy in modern-day China.  
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